Wednesday, November 14, 2012

Double Jeopardy and Restructured Sentences

In Comm. v. Leggett, decided today, the Appeals Court was called on to "measure a reconstructed sentencing scheme against the standards of the prohibition against double jeopardy." The court ruled that "when a defendant is convicted of both an underlying offense and [a related offense], he reasonably cannot have a legitimate expectation of finality in a portion of the total sentence, even if he has fully served that portion." 

In this case, the defendant served a portion of his original sentence upon four convictions, and then moved successfully for resentencing by a different judge. "He contends that the resulting scheme punishes him twice for two of the convictions and thereby violates the ban against double jeopardy. No prior Massachusetts decision appears to have encountered our question squarely." The court continued,
"A judge's sentencing scheme for a defendant convicted of multiple offenses at one trial is typically an integrated plan and not a mechanical formation of separate sanctions...The vacation of a sentencing scheme creates a clean slate for resentencing.
While there is a reasonable expectation of finality, "a legitimate expectation of finality does not extend to each individual sentence within an aggregate scheme for multiple convictions. The prisoner does not have a reasonable expectation of finality in any one part or element of the total bundle of sentences, but rather in the entirety of the scheme." 
"We join [other] circuits in concluding that when a defendant is convicted of both an underlying offense and [a related offense], he reasonably cannot have a legitimate expectation of finality in a portion of the total sentence, even if he has fully served that portion." ...
"In addition, a rule of component sentence finality would operate redundantly with the restrictions established by a reasonable expectation of finality for the aggregate scheme, with quantitative fairness, and with anti-vindictiveness. The defendant's realistic, and therefore reasonable, reliance rests on the "bottom line" of the aggregate sanctions and not on its constituent intervals.
Berry, J., dissented.